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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
INTERMOUNTAIN REAL PROPERTIES,
LLC., an Idaho limited liability company,
as assignee ofTMC CONTRACTORS,
INC.,

)

)

Supreme Court Docket No. 2012-40335

)

) Bingham County Case No. CV-2009-1641

)
)
)
)
v.
)
KEVIN TAGGART, an Individual, CAMDEN )
COURT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
)
company, DRAW, LLC.,an Idaho limited
)
liability company, TIMBERLINE
)
PROPERTIES, LLC., an Idaho limited liability )
company, AARON DEAN EDDINGTON, an )
Individual, CITIZENS COMMUNITY BANK, )
and ALL OTHER PERSON UNKNO\VN
)
CLAIMING INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT
)
PROPERTY,
)
)
)
Defendants.
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Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
for the State ofIdaho for Bingham County.
Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge, Presiding.
For Plaintiff/Appellant:
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Kipp L. Manwaring
Manwaring Law Office, P.A.
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IV

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Defendant/Respondent Draw, LLC ("Draw") agrees with Plaintiff/Appellant Intermountain
Real Properties, LLC ("Intermountain") statement regarding the nature of the case with the following
exceptions:
Intermountain states that Draw owned real property within the Taylorview Development.
It is disputed that Draw's real property was within the Taylorview Development. Intermountain also

states that the district court determined that Draw's property was not within T aylorview
Development. While this statement is accurate, the district court also analyzed this case with the
assumption that Draw's property was actually within Taylorview Development. The district court
still found no genuine issue of material fact existed even if it was assumed that Draw's property was
actually within Taylorview Development.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below.

Draw largely agrees with Intermountain's statement regarding the course of proceedings
below. However, it should be noted that TMC's original Complaint filed on July 23,2009 was not
solely for foreclosure of a materialman's lien. TMC's Complaint also contained claims for "Debt
Due Under Open Account and for Lien Foreclosure," breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and
quantum meruit. R. Vol. I, p. 16 - 29. It should also be noted that Intermountain's Amended
Complaint filed on August 7, 2009 contained claims in the following order: Count 1- Breach of
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Contract, Count Two - Open Account, Count Three - Unjust Enrichment, and Count Four - Lien
Foreclosure. R. Vol. I, p. 37-54.
C.

Statement of Facts.

1.

Shawn Allen sold lots located in Shelley, Bingham County, Idaho, to Kevin Taggart

and Timberline, LLC. R. Vol. I, p. 138. Timberline was owned by Kevin Taggart. Order Granting
Motion to Augment, Doc. 3, p. 2, para. 1.
I

Subsequently, on or about December 21, 2007, Draw purchased an unimproved lot

in Shelley, Bingham County, Idaho, from Timberline Properties, LLC. R. VoL I, p. 227; Order
Granting Motion to Augment, Doc. 1, p. 2, para. 2.

3.

In April of 2008, defendant Kevin Taggart entered into a contract with TMC

Contractors to pave a driveway/parking lot in a development in Shelley, Bingham County, Idaho.
Order Granting Jvlotion to Augment, Doc. 3, p. 2, para. 2; R. VoL I, p. 36.

4.

The Proposal and Contract from TMC for the paving work indicates it was sent to

Kevin Taggart, Century 21 Advantage, 170 W. Main St., Rigby, ID 83442, Attn: Kevin Taggart 5291750 Fax, 745-5221. It was signed as "Accepted By" by Kevin Taggart. R. VoL I, p. 36.
5.

In October, 2008, TMC performed the paving work and sent Kevin Taggart an invoice

for the amount due. R. Vol. I, p. 30 and 53.
6.

Draw was not a party to or involved with the TMC contract in any way and only

became aware that the parking lot/driveway was being paved after it was completed. Order
Granting Motion to Augment, Doc. 1, p. 2, para. 6; Doc. 2, p. 2, para. 6; Doc. 3, p. 2, para. 3. Kevin
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Taggart has never had an ownership interest in Draw and was not Draw's agent. Order Granting
Motion to Augment, Doc. 1, p. 3, para. 12; Doc. 3, p. 2, para. 3-4.

7.

Draw only became aware of the existence of the TMC paving contract when it was

served with the Complaint in this matter. Order Granting Motion to Augment, Doc. L p. 2, para.
6; Doc. 2, p. 2, para. 6.
8.

Draw's property was and is vacant, unimproved land. Order Granting Motion to

Augment, Doc. 1, p. 3, para. 13; Doc. 3, p. 2, para. 3. Prior to TMC paving the parking lot/driveway

for Kevin Taggart, Draw had and continues to have access to its property by way of a separate gravel
road. Order Granting Motion to Augment, Doc. 1, p. 2. para. 5; Doc. 2, p. 2, para. 5; Doc. 3, p. 2,
para. 3; Doc. 9, p. 2, para. 4, p. 3, para. 7-8.
II.

1.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Did Appellant Intermoutain Real Properties, LLC waive its contention that the
district court failed to apply t.l-te language of I.e. § 45-501.

2.

Is Apellant Intermountain Real Properties, LLC entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

3.

Is Respondent Draw, LLC entitled to attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-120(3)?
III.

A.

ARGUMENT

APPELLANT INTERMOUNTAIN REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, WAIVED ITS
CONTENTION THAT THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE
LANGUAGE OF I.e. § 45-501.

Intermountain lists in its "Issues Presented on Appeal" section the following two errors it
claims the district court allegedly made:
3 -
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1.

Did u~e district court err in disregarding the positive testimony found in the
affidavit of Robert Butler proving Draw's real property was within
Taylorview Development?

2.

Did the district court err as a matter of law in awarding Draw some of its
attorney fees based upon I.C. § 12-120(3) finding there was a commercial
transaction between TM C and Draw?

Appellant's Brief, p. 5.
However, in the body of its briefIntermountain also contends that the district court "failed
to apply the clear language of § 45-501." Appellant's Brief, p. 7. Intermountain failed to include
this as an issue in the statement of issues as required by LA.R. 35(a)(4), which states:
the brief of appellant shall contain: ... (4) ... A list of the issues presented on
appeal, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary
detail. The statement of the issues should be short and concise, and should not be
repetitious. The issues shall fairly state the issues presented for review. The statement
of the issues presented will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue fairly
comprised therein.
LA.R. 35(a)(4).

"F ailure of the appellant to include an issue in the statement of issues required by LA.R.
35(a)(4) will eliminate consideration ofthat issue on appeaL" Kugler v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687, 691
(Ct. App. 1991).
This error omitted from Intermountain's "Issues Presented on Appeal" cannot be considered
a subsidiary issue fairly comprised within the issue of whether the district court disregarded the
positive testimony of Robert Butler, The two issues are separate and distinct. The failure to apply
the language of a statute concerns the interpretation and application of a statute to established facts.
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Conversely, disregarding affidavit testimony is an evidentiary issue.
Pursuant to I.A.R. 3 5( a)( 4) and Idaho case law, this Court should find that Intermountain has
waived the issue as to whether the district court failed to apply the language of I.C. § 45-501.
However, in the event this Court fails to find that Intermountain has waived this issue, Draw has
addressed this alleged error in Section III. Part B-2 below.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT DISREGARD THE TESTIMONY OF
ROBERT BUTLER THAT DRAW'S PROPERTY WAS WITHIN TA YLORVIEW
DEVELOPMENT.

Intermountain contends the district court made two errors not related to attorney fees. First,
that on Intermountain's Motion for Reconsideration, it disregarded positive testimony of Robert
Butler establishing Draw's parcel as being part of Taylorview Development. Second, it contends
in the body of its brief that the district court failed to apply the clear language ofLC. § 45-501. The
district court's decisions were correct in both instances.

1.

The District Court Did Not Disregard the Positive Testimony of Robert
Butler.

Intermountain contends that the district court disregarded the affidavit testimony of Robert
Butler that Draw's parcel was at one time part ofTaylorview Development. Intermountain contends
that the district court erroneously relied upon the "black lines" on the record of survey and the
Assessor's plat to reach its determination that Draw's parcel was not located in Taylorview
Development. Appellant's Brief, p. 9.
The district court found that "based upon the evidence in the record, at best, a fact issue
5 -
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remains whetherornotDraw's Property lies within the Taylorview Development." R. Vol. l,p. 250.
However, after making this finding, the district court performed an in depth analysis with the
assumption that Draw's property was within Taylorview Development. The district court stated the
following in its Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider:
Assuming, however, that Draw's Property does lie within Taylorview
Development, the record does not support a finding that Draw, as an owner of one
of the Taylorview parcels, consented to the paving or authorized the paving through
Taggart as Draw's alleged agent. Taggart testified that he entered into the paving
contract with TMC and that Draw was neither a party to nor involved with the TMC
paving contract in any way.
Nothing in the record supports a theory that Draw explicitly granted Taggart authority
to act in Draw's name. Neither Taggart nor Draw acknowledged any kind of agency
relationship. Since no evidence of a grant of actual authority is found in the record,
there is likewise no evidence to support a theory that Taggart had implied authority
to carry out the purposes of any alleged express authority.
Furthermore, Intermountain has not produced any facts which, taken as true, amount
to evidence of apparent authority or agency by estoppel. Intermountain bases its
agency claim upon the alleged words and conduct of the alleged agent, Taggart, to
establish the agency between Taggart and Draw. Apparent authority is not based on
the words and conduct of the principal towards the agent, but on the principal's
words and conduct toward a third party. Apparent authority cannot arise from the
acts and statements of the agent alone; it must be based upon the principal's words
and conduct. Thus, Taggart's words or conduct toward TMC did not amount to
apparent authority to act on behalf of Draw. Only Draw could establish, by words
or conduct to TMC, that Taggart was Draw's agent. Nothing in the record indicates
that Draw had any contact, by words or actions, with TMC.
R. Vol. I, p. 250-51 (emphasis added).
The district court concluded, stating:
Draw ovvns a parcel of real estate contiguous to the paved road, whether that parcel
lies within or outside of the Taylorview Development. The pavement does not
6 -
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extend on to Draw's parcel. Draw has easement rights over the paved road. The
record does not establish that Draw contracted with TMC to have the road paved, or
agreed to the paving of the road. The record does not establish that Draw authorized
Taggart to act on Draw's behalf, or that Draw's words or conduct toward TMC
established Taggart as Draw's agent.
R. Vol. I, p. 251 (emphasis added).
It is undeniable that the district court did not disregard Robert Butler's testimony but

analyzed the facts assuming that Draw's parcel was within the original Taylorview Development.
However, this assumption did not change the district court's determination that there was no
evidence that Draw was involved in the paving contract or that there was no evidence of any agency
relationship between Draw and Taggart related to the paving contract. As discussed below, this lack
of agency led the district court to grant Draw summary judgment. Whether Draw's property was
within Taylorview Development or not, the district court's decision was correct and this Court
should affirm the same.

2.

The District Court Correctly Applied the Plain Language of1. C. § 45-501.

Assuming, for purposes of this appeal, that Intermountain did not waive this issue on appeal,
the district court correctly applied the language ofLC. § 45-501 to the undisputed facts of this case.
Intermountain appears to believe that if Draw's property was within Taylorview Development, than

it can establish an agency relationship under I.e. § 45-501 between Draw and Allen and/or Taggart.

I.e. § 45-501

states in relevant part:

Right to lien. Every person performing labor upon, or furnishing materials to be used
in the construction ... or who grades, fills in, levels, surfaces or otherwise improves
any land, ... has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or professional
7 -
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services or materials furnished, whether done or furnished at the instance of the
owner of the building or other improvement or his agent; and every contractor,
subcontractor, architect, builder or any person having charge of any mining claim, or
of the construction, alteration or repair, either in whole or in part, of any building or
other improvement, as aforesaid, shall be held to be the agent of the ovvner for the
purpose of this chapter: provided, that the lessee or lessees of any mining claim shall
not be considered as the agent or agents of the owner under the provisions of this
chapter.
1. C. § 45-50 l.
Intermountain focuses on the provision of § 45-501 that states ;'any person having charge of
... any building or other improvement, as aforesaid, shall be held to be the agent of the owner for
the purpose of this chapter." Intermountain contends that the district court failed to apply this
language of § 45-501.
Intermountain's contention is that Shawn Allen and Kevin Taggart were persons having
charge of Taylorview Development because, according Allen's affidavit testimony, he was the
developer, and at one point in time, the owner of Draw's property. Appellant's Brief p. 7-8; R. Vol.
I, p. 138. According to Intermountain, Allen's testimony "established that the private drive was
paved at his or Taggart's direction as the developer and O~TIer of the property." Appellant's Brief,
p.8.
In other words, Intermountain argues that because Allen or Taggart were former owners of
Draw's property they were also person's having charge of Draw' s property at the time of the paving.
Consequently, the district court should have held them to be Draw's agent solely by virtue of the
"person having charge" language of1.C. § 45-501. Intermountain contends that the district court did
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not consider the "person having charge" aspect of the statute because it held that Draw's parcel was
not within Taylorview Development.
Intermountain's contention is without merit. I.C. § 4S-S01 requires that the work be "done
or furnished at the instance of the owner of the building or other improvement or his agent."
(Emphasis added). Contrary to Intermountain's contention, it is undisputed that Allen and Taggart
had no ownership interest or authority over Draw's unimproved property at the time of the paving.
Therefore, Allen's testimony could not establish "that the private drive was paved at [Allen's] or
Taggart's direction as the developer and owner of the property" or that Allen and Taggart were
"person[' s] having charge" of Draw's property.
Since Allen and Taggart were not the owners of Draw's unimproved property at the time of
paving, they could not be persons having charge of Draw's property unless Draw gave them agency
and authority over the property. Idaho Code§ 45-S0 1 requires the work be "done or furnished at the
instance of the owner ... or his agent." The district court applied this language ofLC. § 4S-S01 and
found that there was no evidence to support that Taggart or Allen had any actual, express, implied,
or apparent agency authority to act on Draw's behalf. R. Vol. I, p. 2S0-2S1. As quoted above, the
district court concluded in its Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider:
Draw o\vns a parcel of real estate contiguous to the paved road, whether that parcel
lies within or outside of the Taylorview Development. The pavement does not
extend on to Draw's parcel. Draw has easement rights over the paved road. The
record does not establish that Draw contracted with TMC to have the road paved, or
agreed to the paving of the road. The record does not establish that Draw
authorized Taggart to act on Draw's behalf, or that Draw's words or conduct
toward TMC established Taggart as Draw's agent.
9 -
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R. Vol. I, p. 251 (emphasis added).
Thus, the district court applied the plain language ofLC. § 45-501 and found that there was
no evidence that Allen I or Taggart were Draw's agents at any time after Draw purchased the property
from Timberline. 2
The fact that Taggart and Allen were not owners at the time of paving and that there was no
agency relationship between Draw and Taggart or Allen makes Intermountain's argument that
Draw's property was within Taylorview Development irrelevant and moot. Without an O\vnership
interest or agency relationship, Taggart and Allen could not be "person[' s] having charge" of Draw' s
property.
Thus, even assuming, as the district court did, that Draw's unimproved property was within
Taylorview Development, this fact alone does not make Taggart and/or Allen persons having charge
of Draw's property. To establish that Taggart and/or Allen were persons having charge of Draw's
property Intermountain must show that Draw gave Taggart and/or Allen charge over its property.
The district court found no evidence that Draw gave Taggart and/or Allen charge over its property

I There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Allen was Draw's agent or that Allen
ever had any contact with Draw. The evidence only shows that Allen had contact with Taggart
about the paving work. R. Vol. I, p. 139, para. 13.

Intermountain only argues that Allen and Taggart were Draw's agents by virtue of the
"person having charge" language in I.C. § 45-501. It has not appealed the district court's
decision that Draw did not give Allen and Taggart agency authority. Thus, the district court's
determination that Draw did not give Allen and Taggart agency authority is not an issue before
this Court.
2
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or that Taggart and/or Allen were Draw's agent so as to infer any such authority with regard to the
paving contract. 3
Intermountain also contends that the district court overlooked Draw's interest in the easement
to the private road in the development and that the private road was Draw's access to the public
street. Appellant's Brief, p. 11. The district court considered and addressed the easement in both
its Order Granting Summary Judgment as to Defendant Draw, LLC (R. Vol. I, p. 193), and its Order

Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider (R. Vol. I, p. 250). The district court made the following
determination in its Order Granting Summary Judgment:
Even if Draw has an easement over Taylorview's driveway, which is not in the
record, Intermountain points to no law which would require a dominant estate
owner's payment, save for an express agreement, for the cost of the servient estate
owner's easement improvements.
Vol. I, p. 193.
The district court's determination was correct. This Court has held the following:
[A]bsent a showing that the easement owners' maintenance of the easement created
an additional burden or interference with the servient estate, the servient estate
cannot dictate the standard by which the easement should be maintained,
expend funds to maintain it to the level desired by the servient estate and then
seek reimbursement for those expenditures and contribution for future

3 There is no evidence in the record to show that Allen was a person having charge of the
paving. The evidence in the record contradicts any such assertion. It is undisputed that Taggart,
not Allen, procured the paving estimates and signed the paving contract. R. Vol. I, p. 36, p. 139
para. 13, and p. 218; Order Granting Motion to Augment, Doc. 3, p. 2, para. 2. Thus, according
to the evidence in the record, it was Taggart who took charge ofthe paving work - not Mr. Allen
- and Taggart has admitted that Draw was not a party to or involved with the paving contract in
any way. Order Granting Motion to Augment, Doc. 3, p. 2, para. 3.
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expenditures from the easement ov-mers.

Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 66-67 (2008) (emphasis added) (citing Walker v. Boozer, 140
Idaho 451, 455, 95 P.3d 69, 73 (2004)).
In this case, it was the ov.mers of the servient estate who made the decision to pave the
driveway with no involvement from Draw. As a result, reimbursement for the paving cannot be
sought or extracted from Draw.

It is clear that the district court correctly applied the language ofLe. § 45-501. The district
court's decision concluded that Taggart and/or Allen were not Draw's agents or persons having
charge of Draw's property. The decision followed the language of § 45-501 that requires the
improvements be done at the instance of the owner or his agent and should be affirmed.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRA.NTING DRAW A PART OF
ITS ATTOR.cl\JEY FEES lJNDER I.C. § 12-120(3).

Intermountain contends that the district court erred in finding that a commercial transaction
was the gravamen of Intermountain's complaint because "Draw prevailed at summary judgment in
showing there was no contract, agreement, or transaction between it and Taggart or Allen."

Appellant's Brief p. 15.
The district court did not err in finding that a commercial transaction was the gravamen of
Intermountain's complaint. The district court stated the following in its Order Granting in Part

Defendant Draw, LLC's Request for Attorney Fees and Costs:
Intermountain argues that because there was no privity of contract between TMC (of
whom Intermountain is the predecessor in interest) and Draw, a commercial
12 -
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transaction is not the gravamen of this issues between Intermountain and Draw.
Where the action alleged is one to recover in a commercial transaction, the prevailing
party is entitled to an award of attorney fees under § 12-120(3) regardless of the proof
that the commercial transaction alleged did, in fact, occur.
A review of the Amended Complaint reveals Intermountain's allegation that it
contracted to perform paving work for a commercial development and was not paid
for its labor and materials. Therefore, it sued the parties allegedly responsible for the
paving contract for breach of contract, open account, unjust enrichment, and
foreclosure of its materialman's lien. The gravamen of its lawsuit against the
defendants was a commercial transaction. Despite this Court's finding the Draw was
neither a party to, nor responsible for the paving contract, Draw, as the prevailing
party, is entitled to recover its reasonable attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12120(3).

****
As to Intermountain's contention that its lawsuit is essentially a claim for foreclosure
of its lien, the i\mended Complaint shows otherwise. Intermountain's first cause of
action is for breach of contract. Intermountain seeks $23,442.20 in damages for
breach of the paving contract. Intermountain's second cause of action is to collect
upon an open account. Intermountain again prays for damages in the amount of
$23,442.20, together with accruing interest. In its third cause of action,
Intermountain claims the defendants were unjustly enriched as a result ofthe paving.
Unjust enrichment is an equitable means of recover where there is no express
agreement between the parties.
Intermountain seeks the same monetary
compensation for its alternative theory of liability. Finally, in its fourth cause of
action, Intermountain requests foreclosure of its materialman's lien.
R. Vol. I, p. 252-53.
The district court's decision followed Idaho law and rebuts Intermountain's contention that
because the district court found no transaction between Draw and TMC, Draw should not have been
awarded attorney fees. Indeed, this Court has previously made clear that
\\t'here a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced
by section 12-120(3) ... that claim triggers the application of [I.C. § 12-120(3)] and
a prevailing party may recover fees even though no liability under a contract was
13 -
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established. This same principle applies where the action is one to recover in a
commercial transaction, regardless of the proof that the commercial transaction
alleged did, in fact, occur.
Garnerv. Povery, 151 Idaho 462, 469 (2011) (citing Magic Lantern Productions, Inc. v. Dolsot, 126
Idaho 805, 808 (1995)) (emphasis added). This Court recently reaffirmed this holding in O'Shea v.
High Mark Dev., LLC, 280 P.3d 146, 160 (2012).
Thus, the district court's determination that there was no contract, agreement, or transaction
between Draw and, Taggart, Allen, or TMC does not prevent an award of attorney fees to Draw. The
gravamen ofInterrnountain's Complaint was the paving services TMC provided and the alleged
failure of the parties to pay for those services.

This undoubtedly qualifies as a commercial

transaction. Intermountain alleged that Draw was a part of the commercial transaction through an
agency relationship with Taggart. Therefore Draw is entitled to attorney fees under I.e. § 12-120(3).
Intermountain cites Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes Unlimited, LLC, 151 Idaho
740 (2011) and BECO Const. Co., Inc. V J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 719 (2008), in support of
its contention that since the district court found no commercial transaction occurred between the
parties, then 12-120(3) does not apply. Appellant's Brief, p. 14-15. However, these two cases do
not support Intermountain's position.
The complaint in Hopkins did not allege the existence of a commercial transaction between
the two parties but instead was an action to determine the priority ofliens the individual parties each
filed on the same property. Hopkins, 151 Idaho at 742-43. Thus, this Court held that there was no
commercial transaction between the parties. Id. at 748. Such is not the case in the present matter
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as Intennountain alleged a commercial transaction with Draw, including breach of contract, open
account, and unjust enrichment.
In BECO, the complaint alleged breach of contract, negligence, and intentional interference
with contract between BECO and J-U-B Engineers. BECO, 145 Idaho at 722. BECO ultimately
withdrew its claim for breach of contract. Id. This Court held the following with respect to attorney
fees:
I.C. § 12-120(3) compels an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in any civil
action to recover on a contract for services or "in any commercial transaction." I.e.
§ 12-120(3). \Vhen this action was initiated, BECO asserted a breach of contract
claim against J-U-B and that claim was litigated until August 15, 2005, when BECO
dismissed the claim. BECO asserts that, at most, J-U-B is entitled to recover the $
33,661.92 in fees that were incurred to this point in defending the action. However,
BECO asserts there was neither a contract claim nor a commercial transaction that
would support a fee award under I.C. § 12-120(3) after that point in the litigation.
BECO claims there was no commercial transaction between these parties. The case
at bar clearly involved a "commercial transaction" within the meaning of I.e. §
12-120(3), but the transaction was between the City and BECO and not between
J-U-B and BECO. J-U-B was acting as the City's agent in the transaction but there
was no commercial relationship between J-U-B and BECO. Therefore, I.e. §
12-120(3) does not provide the basis for a fee award to J -U-B after the point where
the contractual claim was dismissed. Up to that point, J-U-B is entitled to its fees
for defending against the contract claim. After that point, J-U-B is not entitled to
its fees because there is no commercial transaction between the parties. The fact that
J-U-B may have been the City's agent is not sufficient to establish an independent
commercial transaction between J-U-B and BECO. We therefore vacate the fee
award and remand this case for detennination and award ofthe amount offees J-U-B
incurred defending BECO's contract claim.
Id. at 726 (emphasis added).
The BECO case support's Draw's case for fees. While there was actually no commercial
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tra.l1saction between BECO and J-U-B, BECO had alleged the existence of a commercial transaction
between the two.

BECO eventually dismissed the claim that encompassed the commercial

transaction. However, this Court upheld the fee award up to the time that BECO dismissed its
breach of contract claim, despite the fact that there was no actual commercial transaction or contract
between BECO and J-U-B.
This Court's decision to uphold the fee award in BECO is instructive as the present case is
similar. Here, the district court found that there was no contract or commercial transaction between
Draw and TMC, Taggart, or Allen. However,just as in BECO, Intermountain alleged a contract and
commercial transaction existed between Draw and TMC, Just as this Court found the award in

BECO to be proper based on the allegation of a commercial transaction despite the fact that no
contract or transaction existed between the parties, the district court's decision to award fees to Draw
in this case was proper. The Court should therefore affirm the district court's award offees to Draw.
D.

APPELLA}.JT INTERMOlJNTAIN IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON
APPEAL.

Intermountain requests attorney fe_es on appeal. It requests fees "in accordance with LA.R.
41 and 35(b)(5)." Appellant's Brief, p. 16. Pursuant to Idaho law, Intermountain failed to properly
request fees and support the request. Intermountain is therefore not entitled to fees on appeal.

1.

Intermountain failed to properly request fees on appeal.

LA.R. 35(a)(5) requires that "if the appellant is claiming attorney fees on appeal the
appellant must so indicate in the division of issues on appeal that appellant is claiming attorney
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fees and state the basis of the claim." LAR. 35( a)( 5) (emphasis added). Intermountain failed to

include its request for fees in its issues presented on appeal section. See Appellant's Brief, p. 5.
Intermountain's failure prevents this Court from awarding Intermountain fees on appeal. As this
Court stated in Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C, 140 Idaho 354 (2004):
LA.R. 41 requires that the request for attorney fees on appeal be made in the first
brief from the respective party. I.A.R. 35(a)(5) and (6) also require that the
requesting party put the request for fees in a separate section after the issues
presented section and the request be discussed in the argument section.

Id. at 365 (emphasis added);
In Cammer. Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208 (2008) this
Court stated that I.A.R. 35(b)(5) "merely requires that a party indicate in the 'Issues on Appeal'
section of its brief that it seeks attorney fees." Id. at 219. Intermountain failed to indicate that it was
requesting attorney fees on appeal in the issues presented section and is therefore not entitled to fees.

2.

Intermountain failed to properly support its request for fees on appeal.

Intermountain is also not entitled to attorney fees on appeal because it failed to support its
request with propositions of law, authority or argument.
Where a party requesting attorney fees on appeal cites the applicable statute but
does not present argument in compliance with I.A.R. 35(b)(6), this Court will
not address the request. Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133
Idaho 866, 874, 993 P.2d 1197, 1205 (1999). Under LA.R 35(b)(6), the argument
portion of the respondent's brief"shall contain the contentions of the respondent with
respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." LA.R.
35(b)(6).

Goldman v. Graham, 139 Idaho 945, 947 (2004) (emphasis added).
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Merely citing LA.R. 41 and 3 5(b)( 5) is insufficient for this COlli"1: to consider a fee request
on appeal:
[NJeither [LA.R. Rule 3 5(b)( 5) or Rule 41] provide a mechanism by which this Court
can award attorney fees. Rule 35(b)(5) merely requires that a party indicate in the
"Issues on Appeal" section of its brief that it seeks attorney fees. As we have held
numerous times, Rule 41 provides the procedure for requesting attorney fees on
appeal, but is not authority alone for awarding fees. See e.g. Goodman v. Lothrop,
143 Idaho 622, 628, 151 P .3d 818, 824 (2007).

Commer. Ventures, Inc., 145 Idaho at 219.
This Court has repeatedly enforced this rule. In State v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., 141 Idaho
102 (2005), this Court denied attorney fees to a respondent who requested fees but only referred the
court to LA.R. 41, stating:
We have repeatedly held that a reference to Rule 41 is not sufficient by itselfto
properly request an award of attorney fees on appeal. Bream v. Benscoter, l39
Idaho 364, 79 P.3d 723 (2003). The requesting party must point to a statute or
contractual provision authorizing such award.

Id. at 109 (emphasis added).

In Parkside Sch., Inc. v. Bronco Elite Arts & Ath., LLC, 145 Idaho 176 (2008), this Court
again denied a request for fees, stating:
Bronco Elite seeks attorney fees on appeal under LA.R. 41(a). However, it neither
submits legal argument in support of its request, nor specifies the statute or
contractual provision pursuant to which an award of fees would be available.
"As we have long held and oft repeated, Idaho Appellate Rule 41 does not provide
an independent basis for attorney fees on appeal because it is a procedural rule. Ater
v.Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses, 144 Idaho 281,286,144 Idaho 281, 160
P.3d 438, 443 (2007). Therefore, fees are denied.

Id. at 179 (emphasis added); see also Dominguez v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7 (2005)
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(holding that because of failure to cite to appropriate authority, fees not granted on appeal).
Intermountain failed to include its request for attorney fees on appeal in the issues on appeal
section of its brief. Further, Intermountain's request for fees merely cites I.A.R. 41 and 35(b)(5) and
fails to cite to a statute or contractual provision authorizing such an award. Pursuant to Idaho law,
Intermountain's request for fees on appeal should be denied.
E.

DRA W IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL UNDER I.e. § 12120(3).

In order for a prevailing party to receive an award of fees and costs, such an award must be
provided for by a statute or contract. I.C. § 12-120(3) provides for an award of attorney fees in this
case. It states:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods,
wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except
transactions for personal or household pLLrposes. The term "party" is defined to mean
any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of
Idaho or political subdivision thereof.
Id.

1.

Draw is entitled to fees on appeal under the commercial transaction prong
afle § 12-120(3)

I. C. § 12-120(3) provides for fees in "any commercial transaction." Commercial transaction
is defined as "all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." In its
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complaint, Intermountain alleged the existence of a commercial transaction. Intermountain's claims
against Draw were based entirely upon Draw allegedly entering into a transaction with TMC for
paving services. This undoubtedly qualifies as Intermountain's attempt to recover based upon a
commercial transaction.
The commercial transaction must also constitute the gravamen of the lawsuit. In Brower v.

E.I DuPont, 117 Idaho 780 (1990), the Supreme Court held:
the award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is
remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is whether the commercial
transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not
appropriate under I. C. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial transaction is integral to
the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to
recover. To hold otherwise would be to convert the award of attorney's fees from an
exceptional remedy justified only by statutory authority to a matter of right in
virtually every lawsuit filed.
Brower, 117 Idaho at 784 (emphasis added); see Blimka v. _My Web TiVholesaler, 143 Idaho 723, 728-

29 (2007).
The commercial transaction (the paving services) comprised the gravamen of Intermountain' s
lawsuit and constitutes the basis upon which Intermountain attempted to recover on all its claims.
All four ofIntermountain's claims in its Amended Complaint - breach of contract, open account,
unjust enrichment, and lien foreclosure - arise out of TMC allegedly providing paving services for
Draw. Without the alleged commercial transaction between Draw and TMC, Intermountain could
not have brought a breach of contract or open account claim and could not have alleged that Draw
had been unjustly enriched. Further, TMC's lien was filed based upon the performance of the paving
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services and lntennountain sought to foreclose the lien based upon those same paving services.
In sum, Intennountain could not have proceeded with or recovered on any of its claims
without alleging that Draw contracted for or was somehow involved in a commercial transaction
with TMC. Thus, the alleged commercial transaction between Draw and TMC for paving services
was integral and indispensable to Intennountain' s claims and therefore was the gravamen of
Intennountain's lawsuit.
2. Draw is entitled to recoverfees under the contract prong of1. C. § J2- J20(3).
It is unassailable that Intennountain alleged in its complaint that a contract between

lntennountain and Draw existed and that Draw breached that contract. The case law could not be
clearer that' [w]here a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced
by section 12-120(3) ... that claim triggers the application of [I.C. § 12-120(3)] and a prevailing
party may recover fees even though no liability under a contract was established." Farmers Nat.
Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 73 (1994).
A commercial transaction is not required when recovery is sought on the basis of a contract

as Idaho Code § 12-120(3) "provides for the recovery of attorney fees incurred in litigation based
upon any contract." Id. (emphasis added). "Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides for an award of
reasonable attorney fees 'in any civil action to recover ... on [a] contract relating to ... services.'"
Noak v. Idaho Dep 't ofCorr., 271 P.3d 703, 711 (Idaho 2012) (quoting I.C. § 12-120(3)).

Intennountain alleged the existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced by I.C.

§ 12-120(3). Therefore, Draw is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal under the
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contract prong ofI.C. § 12-120(3) should it prevail against Intennountain's appeaL

3.

Draw is entitled to fees under the open account prong of Ie § 12-120(3).

Further, Intennountain brought a claim to recover on an open account. Similar to a claim on
a contract, § 12-120(3) provides for an award of fees "in any civil action to recover on an open
account." I.C § 12-120(3) (emphasis added). Thus, the action for an open account does not have
to be based upon a commercial transaction in order to get an award of fees. An action for an open
account in a civil action is all that is required.
Intennountain sought to recover from Draw on a claim for open account. Therefore, Draw
is entitled to an award of attorney fees under the open account prong of I.C. § 12-120(3).
IV.

CONCLUSION

Intennountain waived its contention that the district court failed to properly apply the
language of I.C § 45-501 when it failed to include it as an issue on appeal pursuant to LA.R.
35(a)(4). Nonetheless, the district court did not disregard the testimony of Robert Butler, but
analyzed the facts under the assumption that Draw's property was within Taylorview Development.
The district court correctly applied the language ofLC § 45-501 and deternlined that there was no
evidence of agency between Draw and Taggart and/or Allen. Consequently, the district court's
decision granting Draw summary judgment was correct and this Court should affinn the same.
The gravamen oflntennountain's Complaint was the paving services TMC provided. This
is clearly a commercial transaction which Intennountain alleged was between Draw and TMC
through an agency relationship. As a result, the district court's decision granting Draw partial
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attorney fees under I.e. § 12-120(3) was correct. This Court should affirm the district court's
decision and also award Draw attorney fees and costs on appeal should it prevail on appeal.
Intermountain failed to properly request and support its request for costs and fees on appeal and this
Court should therefore deny Intermountain's request should it prevail on appeal.
DATED this \

L{ day of January, 2013.
THOMSEN STEPHENS

By:
Ribhard R. Friess, Esq.
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